The new European political economy of wage formation: Party-political preferences, growth models and EU institutions
My research interests focus on European comparative political economy and labor markets, with a particular attention to the political economy of wage formation. In my dissertation I explore in three single-authored papers some the changes, which have occurred in this area by focusing on the role of different party-political constellations, political-economic growth models as well as the role of EU institutions.
In my first paper, which has been recently published in European Union Politics (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14651165221102696) I examine the drivers of the Commission’s policy recommendations on member states’ wage policies and in particular consider whether those are driven by ideological or technocratic preferences.
In the second paper, I consider through the use of multilingual quantitative text analysis and multilevel models, the changing salience of minimum wages compared to other policies designed to supplement the income of low-wage policies.
Finally, in my third paper, I examine minimum wages as a driver of growth in different types of growth models, by examining the role of minimum wages as a driver of growth in export-led and domestic demand-led growth models.