Gabriel Fernandes Rocha Guimarães

gabrielfrg@bol.com.br

PhD student in Sociology in Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP), Institute of Social and Political Studies. Rio de Janeiro State University.

1.227 words

Brexit: the return of fascist ultra-nationalism?

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom the European Union has generated intense discussions in recent days, either in the media, on social networks or in public debate in their various spheres. The most recurrent opinions have been that the dangers of Nazi-fascism is in the process of returning to the old continent, and with it all that come true throughout the twentieth century, especially in its first half. It is true that a different right from that classic, traditional, liberal-conservative, is capitalizing the right in several European countries. It is a right linked to what is known as the "New European Right", a school of thought that begins in the 70s in France with Alain de Benoist, and today by well-known names like authors as Alexander Duguim, Tomislav Sunic, Guillaume Faye, among others . In general more protectionist about the market, and more connected to what Ferdinand Tonnies called gemeinschaft, or "closed community" to culture and social life, NER gradually is gaining some legitimacy, and even when they do not get quite considerable electoral successes, can impose, to some extent, their agenda. Its idea that the European Union has lost the original purpose and became a technocratic directory in favor of big business and enterprises who want cheap labor coming from the "third world", little caring about the interests of other sectors of European “native” populations can gradually take shape. NDE argues that in the flow of this process, the cultural left seizes the masses of immigrants to impose their own multicultural calendar, create ultra cosmopolitan societies, not linked to a common collective memory and even dilute national identities from "stock population replacemente ". The recent departure of UK from EU, with the migration issue at the heart of the debate, and soon after Sadik Khan have been elected mayor of London, the strengthening of Marine Le Pen in France, the defeat of Norbert Hofer in Austria by a difference of only 30 thousand votes, among other manifestations of nationalism, show the ideological force that NDE gained in recent years, coming from being almost a cult in the 70s, to a concrete policy proposal, prone to be implemented in many countries. But an important detail about the problem is that parties with speech and forthcoming proposals of NER gain more electoral strength, or can impose its agenda in countries where the migration issue is more present. France, Austria, and Germany, with the emergence of the "Alternative for Germany" and Pegida and its massive street demonstrations, are good examples. In countries where mass migration did not become such a prominent dilemma, the right tends to remain in its most traditional form, as in Portugal and Spain, which is remarkable the low presence of far-right parties. Just as in the 60s and 70s, when mass migration was not so present throughout Europe, the most radical right did not grow. Chronic ethnic stratification has always been a problem, having been treated, often in similar ways, by governments with very different political orientations, as was the landmark case of communist Poland. Wladislaw Gomulka, then important member of the Polish Communist Party said, after the war that true socialism could only be developed in a Poland a hundred percent Polish, causing the deportation of almost all ethnic Germans, who at that time were about 6 percent of the population living in Poland. A few years before the German Nazis had been the true masters of mass deportation in similar terms. In Romania the Communist regime was imposed, among other things, calling for the historic rivalry of Romanian with Hungarian minority living in the west of the country. In the Catholic and clerical-conservative Slovakia of priest Josef Tizo, Jews were persecuted more violently than in Italy of Mussolini, at least until the end of the 30s. In Churchill’s England, the fascists led by Oswald Mosley did not get the successes some of their counterparts in continental Europe did. England did not face the same ethnic and cultural problems of centre-eastern Europe, and the absence of a strong movement of Marxist-Leninist inspiration did not make necessary the circumstantial alliance between conservatives and fascists. However, in the neighborhoods in east London, the part of town (and perhaps of England) where there was a higher concentration of non-English population, Mosley’s electorate increased very considerably. This shows that, in a context of chronic ethnic conflict, the traditionally parliamentary Albion could have gone to a darker path too. Apparently the problem arrived on the island now, and the outcome of the recent referendum gives signs about it. Regardless of the more or less universalistic political and philosophical traditions in some countries, chronic ethnic conflicts become a "problem" to be treated. The neo-Herderian line of the growing New Right, which is against the Western military intervention in the poorest countries, but for greater internal homogeneity in their own can obviously convert non-violence to outside nations in violence against internal minorities. However, so far it would be a little early and perhaps an exaggeration to say that the nationalist wave that penetrates in Western Europe, and in particular the most recent case of the UK, will result necessarily in Hitler and Mussolini. This is a remnant of 68th thought that has little concept of the multidimensional and varied character of nationalism, and thinks that it is only a vague idea that can easily be shot down with a good moral argument. This is a phenomenon that can manifest both by the bestiality of the German Einsatzgruppe in occupied Ukraine in 1941, as the peaceful demonstrations of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. It also is not a mere abstract idea, but something almost concrete that penetrates a high number of spheres of people's lives, even in everyday life, from the education programs established in the ministries to which language is used on traffic signs. The fact that governments with very different political and ideological orientations can’t just ignore the problem, are good examples of its magnitude. And the turn of the left, in huge measures, towards cultural and inclusion issues is another example. England, indeed wanted to be free from Brussels, its "parallel state" and to have greater control of its borders and migratory wave, but that does not necessarily means a radical implementation of Hitler's model of total and absolute congruence between culture / race and state. It means greater autonomy in controlling the massive migration without having to go through the EU approve. That is, the idea of maintaining a certain internal cultural homogeneity does exist, but not in exorbitant levels as it is usually said nowadays. Even because Nigel Farage’s UKIP party, who led the whole process, is very strong in its movement sphere but is relatively weak, electorally, not having full conditions of seizing the state and crush any opposition that may exist. In relation to the controversial topic of Islam and terrorism, within the Arab and Muslim countries there are also policies who intend to control salafist / Wahhabist movements, given the traditional rivalry between Arab nationalism and Salafism in a country like Egypt, between secularists and Salafists in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as between pan-turkists and Salafists in Turkey. Thus, the border closures due to, among other things, terrorism and Brussels direction in migration policies, may not be seen necessarily as a step towards the reopening of Auschwitz.